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Abstract 
 
The academic literature on equality of opportunity has burgeoned. More recently, the concepts 
and measures have begun to be used by policy institutions, including in specific sectors like 
health and education.  Indeed, it is argued that one advantage of focusing on equality of 
opportunity is that policy makers are more responsive to that discourse than on equality of 
outcomes per se.  This paper presents a critique of equality of opportunity in the policy context. 
While the empirical analysis to which the literature has given rise is useful and is to be 
welcomed, current methods for quantifying and implementing the concept with a view to 
informing the policy discourse face a series of fundamental questions that remain unanswered. 
Without a full appreciation of these difficulties, these methods may prove to be misleading in the 
policy context. 
  
                                                 
* Cornell University. 
** The World Bank. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors, and should not be attributed to 
The World Bank; its Board of Directors; or the countries they represent. 
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1. Introduction  
 In policy and political discourse, “equality of opportunity” is the new motherhood and 
apple pie.  It is often contrasted with equality of outcomes, with the latter coming off worse. 
Equality of outcomes is seen variously as Utopian, as infeasible, as detrimental to incentives, and 
even as inequitable if outcomes are the result of differing efforts. Equality of opportunity, on the 
other hand, is interchangeable with phrases such as ‘leveling the playing field’, ‘giving 
everybody an equal start’ and ‘making the most of inherent talents.’  In its strongest form, the 
position is that equality of outcomes should be irrelevant to policy; what matters is equality of 
opportunity. 
 
 But the application of the broad concept of equality of opportunity requires that it be 
specified sufficiently precisely to be measurable and implementable.  The last two decades have 
seen a number of attempts to formulate the concept of equality of opportunity with a view to 
policy application, not least in the World Bank through its World Development Report 2006 
(World Bank, 2005) and the subsequent “mini-industry” which has developed in estimating 
measures of inequality of opportunity using household survey data (for example, de Barros et al. 
2009).  The empirical work appears to have given confidence to those who would use the 
concept of equality of opportunity in the policy context, that it can be measured and quantified, 
so that policies can be designed and judged according to it. 
 
 However, attempts to quantify and apply the concept of equality of opportunity in a 
policy context have also revealed a host of problems of a conceptual and empirical nature, 
problems which may in the end even question the practical usefulness of the concept.  The object 
of this paper is to review and critique recent attempts at specifying and quantifying equality of 
opportunity, and to assess the extent to which they do in fact allows us to discard equality of 
outcomes as a key part of policy evaluation. 
 
 The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 sets out the philosophical basics of equality 
of opportunity, focusing on key writings in the last three decades.  Section 3 then introduces the 
attempts at application and quantification at a general level, particularly in the policy context, 
and presents a critique.  Section 4 carries the argument forward to the specifics of the education 
and health domains, to see how the general arguments play out in these settings.  Section 5 
concludes. 
  
2. Equality of Opportunity: The Basics  
 The core premise of the literature on equality of opportunity is the idea that inequalities 
in outcomes can be partitioned into justifiable (or legitimate) sources of inequality (let us call 
them the J’s) and unjustifiable (or illegitimate) sources (let us call them the U’s).  The idea is that 
inequalities in outcomes are to be seen as just (or fair) insofar as they are driven by inequalities 
in the J’s, and unjust (or unfair) insofar as they are driven by inequalities in the U’s.  The 
practical usefulness of the idea of inequality of opportunity boils down to two sets of questions: 
Is there agreement on the set of influences on the outcome in question and on whether each is a J 
or a U?  And, conditional on a consensus or close to a consensus on these questions, can the 
inequalities be partitioned empirically in a fashion that is credible and meaningful for policy?  
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 On the face of it, these are two separate exercises – the first conceptual (and normative), 
and the second empirical.  But in practice many of the challenges at the conceptual level only 
surface when the empirical operationalization begins, and when researchers begin to grapple 
with a practical partition of influences on outcomes into the J’s and the U’s.  As a result, while 
appearing to resolve the key conceptual questions, many of the philosophical discussions in the 
literature actually leave many key questions unanswered.  Thus while this section, which focuses 
on the philosophical underpinnings of equality of opportunity, will highlight some of the 
conceptual issues involved, it will not resolve them all.  Only after we have gone through the 
empirical applications in the next two sections will the full gamut of conceptual difficulties 
become apparent.  
  
 The modern flowering of the equality of opportunity literature in economics owes much 
to the work of Roemer (1998), who is recognized for example by the authors of the World 
Development Report 2006 (see World Bank, 2005; Bourguignon, Ferreira and Walton, 2007). 
Roemer sets out ideas on both questions.  The central conceptual distinction in Roemer is to 
“separate the influences on the outcome a person experiences into circumstances and effort:  the 
former are attributes of a person’s environment for which he should not be held responsible, and 
effort is the choice variable for which he should be held responsible” (Roemer, 2008).  It is this 
distinction which Roemer, and followers like de Barros et al. (2009), attempt to implement in 
empirical policy oriented work. 
 
 Roemer (1998) also suggests a way to partition inequalities empirically into justifiable 
inequalities (in his book, inequalities in effort) and unjustifiable inequalities (in his book 
inequalities in circumstances), from which he arrives at a measure of inequality of opportunity. 
He addresses the question of how exactly to calibrate the effort of an individual, and argues that 
the rank of an individual in the effort distribution across individuals with the same circumstances 
should be the relevant metric.  De Barros et al. (2009) use alternative metrics which we will 
discuss below.  But the applications all rely on the assumption that circumstances and effort can 
indeed be separated.  While the concepts are clear in principle, as we shall see the applications 
invariably raise the question of whether they can ever be separated in practice, or even 
conceptually.  And as we will also see, questions arise as to whether there is more to the J vs. U 
distinction than ‘circumstances’ vs. ‘effort.’  
 
 As Roemer (1998, 2008) recognizes, his contribution feeds into an earlier philosophical 
debate which was ignited by Ronald Dworkin (1981a, 1981b) when he asked the question “What 
is equality?”  Dworkin argued essentially that certain types of preferences should not elicit an 
egalitarian redistributive response.  For example, if a person would be deeply unhappy if unable 
to drive fast cars, this should not arouse an egalitarian sentiment to transfer resources to this 
person.  On the other hand, if a person was born with low inherent abilities to prosper in the 
market place, this might be a legitimate basis for redistribution.  
 
 Of course a lot, in fact everything rests on coming to a separation of legitimate and 
illegitimate differences for the egalitarian impulse.  As Cohen (1989) pointed out, what if 
preferences (even for fast cars) were the result of an upbringing which inculcated those 
preferences, or brooked no dissent from them?  Or if preferences between work and leisure 
(“laziness”) were inculcated in the same way?  Thus a conceptual separation of influences into 
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those which are legitimate to take into account in addressing inequality and those which are not 
merely pushes the issue to the next level of how this separation is to be made, conceptually and 
practically.  
 
 The above discussion can be related to a parallel discussion in economics on whether the 
distribution of ex ante or ex post utility should be the relevant object in social welfare 
assessment. Milton Friedman (1962) made the ex-ante case: 
 “Consider a group of individuals who initially have equal endowments and who agree 
voluntarily to enter a lottery with very unequal prizes.  The resultant inequality of income is 
surely required to permit the individuals in question to make the most of their initial 
equality…Much of the inequality of income produced by payment in accordance with the product 
reflects ‘equalizing’ difference or the satisfaction of men’s tastes for uncertainty…Redistribution 
of income after the event is equivalent to denying them the opportunity to enter the lottery.” 
(Friedman, 1962) 
 
Further, Friedman is clear that this is not just a fanciful special example but that it captures 
strong elements of reality: 
 “This case is far more important in practice than would appear by taking the case of a 
‘lottery’ literally.  Individuals choose occupations, investments and the like partly in accordance 
with their tastes for uncertainty.  The girl who tries to become a movie actress rather than a civil 
servant is deliberately choosing to enter a lottery, so is the individual who invests in penny 
uranium stocks rather than government bonds.” 
 
The argument, which clearly draws on Friedman’s earlier work on choice under risk (Friedman 
and Savage (1948), Friedman (1953)) encapsulates the central point that the observed inequality 
of income may overstate ex ante inequality. In the pure case, there is no ex ante inequality at all 
and yet risk produces ex post inequality.  But for Friedman this ex post inequality has no claims 
on our moral intuitions and should not elicit a redistributive impulse – to do so otherwise would 
be “equivalent to denying them the opportunity to enter the lottery.” 
 
 In the more general case, when individuals differ in endowments, observed inequality 
will be a combination of the two effects.  But Friedman’s pure case is nevertheless useful for 
smoking out core intuitions on whether outcomes or opportunities matter more.  Suppose in the 
pure case one of the outcomes is destitution – below a poverty line, say.  Recall that by 
construction there is perfect equality before the lottery.  Further, all individuals freely choose to 
participate in the lottery.  To use the terminology of Dworkin (1981b), this is “option luck”, 
chosen by the individual, not “brute luck” over which the individual has no control.  And yet, 
upon exercising this free choice starting with perfect equality, after the lottery is drawn not only 
is there inequality, but some are destitute.  The outcome is brutal even though the luck was not 
brute.  When faced with such destitution, do our moral intuitions guide us to redistribute after the 
event, or do they guide us to stand firm because to redistribute would be in effect to deny the 
consequences of equality of opportunity (and the consequences of the doctrine of responsibility 
for actions as advanced by Dworkin)?  
 
 Kanbur (1987) has argued that in the case of destitution as an outcome of the lottery 
choice, our moral intuitions do indeed veer towards ex post redistribution and support for the 
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destitute.  To emphasize the point, imagine yourself serving on a soup line of the indigent. 
Consider then the idea that we would condition the doling out of soup on an assessment of 
whether it was circumstance or effort which led to the outcome of the individual in front of us to 
be in the soup line.  Surely this is morally repugnant, and it establishes that at least for extreme 
outcomes the outcome based perspective dominates any considerations of opportunity.  Indeed, 
this point is taken on board by Bourguignon, Ferreira and Walton (2007) in their definition of 
equitable development policy which “makes avoidance of severe deprivation a constraint that 
must be satisfied in the process of pursuing the broader objective of equal opportunity.” 
 
 Notice that none of the above is to deny that outcome based redistribution will have 
incentive effects. Indeed, in general so will an opportunity based intervention, or any 
intervention.  In the usual way, as in the classic work of Mirrlees (1971), the incentive effects 
will have to be balanced against the egalitarianism of the outcome based social welfare function. 
The point, rather, is that in a setting designed to strengthen the case for the opportunity based 
perspective to the utmost, outcome based concerns nevertheless come through, and ex post 
inequality of outcomes enters the evaluation even when there is perfect ex ante equality of 
opportunity. 
 
 The Friedman example can be used to elaborate on a conceptual difficulty with the 
concept of equality of opportunity already alluded to.  If parents engage in the Friedman lottery, 
the outcomes will lead to inequality among their children even though, by construction, there is 
perfect equality of circumstance among the parents.  Parents who win big in the lottery will be 
able to spend more for their children’s education, for example, than parents who lose big from 
the decisions they have all made with full knowledge of the outcomes.  The lottery outcomes are 
now the circumstances of the children.  The doctrine of equality of opportunity would now lead 
us to redistribute in order to address inequality of circumstance among children.  But, equally, it 
would lead us to not redistribute across parents because to do so would be “equivalent to denying 
them the opportunity to enter the lottery.”  Equality of opportunity, it would seem, is caught 
between two inconsistent Old Testament Biblical injunctions from Deuteronomy: 
 “for I, the Lord your God, am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers on the 
children, and on the third and the fourth generations of those who hate Me” versus “Fathers 
shall not be put to death for their sons, nor shall sons be put to death for their fathers; everyone 
shall be put to death for his own sin.” 
 
 Of course the above example with parents and children takes us back to other examples 
in Cohen (1989) which highlighted difficulties in Dworkin’s (1981a, 1981b) attempts to 
introduce the notion of responsibility into egalitarian philosophy by drawing a distinction 
between preferences and resources.  If preferences are themselves determined by resources, say 
parental resources, then a clean separation may not be possible, certainly empirically and perhaps 
even conceptually.  These difficulties are the subject of a large literature and debate.  Key 
perspectives in this, from Roemer (1998), Barry (2005), and Swift (2005) are summarized by 
Jusot, Tubeuf and Trannoy (2013) as follows: 
 “In what we call Barry’s view, circumstances are past variables and efforts are the 
variables which reflect the free will of the present generation. In Roemer’s view, the vector of 
circumstances includes all past variables, and the descendant’s efforts must be cleaned from any 
contamination coming from circumstances. In Swift’s view, the vector of circumstances only 
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includes past variables, which have no consequences on children efforts. In other terms, the 
vector of circumstances must be cleaned from any correlation with child’s efforts.” (p1473)  
 
 The differences between these views are only one part of a large literature on a range of 
issues in equality of opportunity1 which reflect basic ethical disagreements that are unlikely to be 
resolved easily, and in any case need to be supplemented by the case of extreme outcomes 
discussed above, and how our moral intuitions in such extreme cases translate in turn to less 
extreme conditions. 
 
3. Implementation in a Policy Context:  Income Inequality 
 The ethical disagreements on basic concepts notwithstanding, implementation of 
measures of (in)equality of opportunity has proceeded apace.  The burgeoning literature has 
provided a plethora of measures and applications to data sets, from early attempts by Roemer and 
his associates (for example Roemer et al. 2003), to more recent applications in specific contexts 
like health (for example, Jusot, Tubeuf and Trannoy, 2013).  Thus the partitioning of influences 
on outcomes into legitimate and illegitimate has now been undertaken empirically in a large 
number of contributions across many countries.  
 
 Of particular interest is a line of analysis established by the work of de Barros et al. 
(2009).  In part this is because it has become popular throughout the World Bank (spreading 
from Latin America where it was developed originally to other Bank regions), and through that 
channel to the broader policy-oriented literature.  Its popularity no doubt owes much to its 
simplicity, being relatively straightforward to apply with readily available household survey 
data.  In part, though, our interest in the work stems from the fact that in empirically 
operationalizing the equality of opportunity approach researchers are forced to confront a whole 
host of tough questions that are more easily overlooked in conceptual discussions.  How 
satisfactorily these questions can be answered at the empirical level determines ultimately the 
practical usefulness of the whole equality of opportunity approach.  
 
 There are, in fact, two somewhat separate approaches in de Barros et al. (2009) and we 
will take these up in turn in this section and in the next. In the first approach the primary 
outcome variable is the usual variable used to calculate standard inequality and poverty measures 
– earnings, income or consumption.  The conceptual basis and implementation method is stated 
succinctly by de Barros et al. (2009) as follows: 
 “To measure inequality of opportunity for a certain outcome, total inequality in the 
outcome can be decomposed into two parts: one resulting from circumstances beyond individual 
control and a second part resulting from unequal individual effort and luck….First, six variables 
related to circumstances exogenous to the individual were identified from the most 
comprehensive data sets available: gender, race or ethnicity, birthplace, the educational 
attainment of the mother, the educational attainment of the father, and the main occupation of 
the father…. Then the sample was partitioned (in each country) into groups or “cells,” such that 
all individuals in any given cell have exactly the same combination of circumstances.  The 
resulting subgroups are known in the literature as “types.” These cells are then compared with 
                                                 
1 A recent selection would include Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013), Ooghe, E., Schokkaert, E. and Van de Gae (2007) and 
Peragine (2004).  
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one another.  The difference in outcomes between cells can be attributed to inequality of 
opportunity, while the differences within cells can be considered the result of effort or luck.”   
(pp. 125-126). 
 
A decomposable measure of inequality, the Theil-L index, is used in a non-parametric method of 
quantifying the extent of variation in income accounted for by within cell variation and between 
cell variation, the latter the being identified as “inequality of opportunity” (IEO).  
  
 It is easy to see why this method has caught on. It is relatively simple and intuitive. 
Indeed, it is nothing more than standard inequality decomposition analysis which has been 
conducted in economics and development economics for a long time (Kanbur, 2007).  For 
example, the percentage of inequality accounted for by caste has been a staple of the Indian 
discourse, as has the contribution of ethnic differences to inequality in Malaysia, as has the 
north-south divide in Ghana, and so on.  What is new is twofold.  First is its systematic 
application in consistent manner across a range of countries as done for Latin America in de 
Barros et al. (2009).  Second, crucially, is the interpretation and labeling of the between group 
component in the inequality decomposition as inequality of opportunity, thereby linking to the 
philosophical literature discussed the last section, and also thereby linking to the appeal in the 
policy discourse of “equality of opportunity” as opposed to equality of outcome. 
 
 On the basis of this method, de Barros et al. (2009) conclude that “between a quarter 
(Colombia) and half (Guatemala) of the income inequality that we observe among adults in Latin 
America is due to the circumstances they faced when they started out in life – at the very outset, 
through no fault of their own. And while their race, sex, and location all played a role, no 
circumstances were more powerful than their mothers’ education and their fathers’ incomes.”  
(p. xviii).  Again, that race, sex, location, and parental education and income are determinants of 
outcomes in the income dimension is not a surprise – it is a commonplace finding in almost 
every non-parametric and parametric analysis of income distribution.  What is new is the 
additional interpretation that between 25% and 50% of outcome inequality can be attributed to 
circumstance variables and therefore to inequality of opportunity. 
 
 How might such findings impact on the policy debate?  When presented with these 
findings, how might policy makers react?  One response might be to say “You mean inequality 
of opportunity is as high as 50%?  Gosh, we must do something about it!”  But equally another 
response might be “You mean inequality of opportunity is only 25%?  Gosh, we are doing quite 
well on the equity front so let us focus on other priorities!”  Indeed, the second response might 
even be made if the figure was 50% rather than 25%. 
 
 The response of de Barros et al. (2009) to the possibility that such quantification might 
lead to a downplaying of the need for redistribution is to emphasize the fact that these estimates 
are in fact a lower bound on inequality of opportunity: 
 “…although the six variables employed in this chapter are a richer set of circumstances 
than those used in any previous study known to the authors, it is still possible to think of other 
relevant variables that are not observed.  A “true” measure of inequality of opportunity would 
require using all relevant circumstance variables to partition the population into types. But this 
is, of course, extremely unlikely to be feasible in practice for any conceivable data set, and it is 
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certainly impossible for the seven countries examined here.  The empirical estimates defined in 
this chapter – regardless of whether parametric – should therefore be interpreted as lower-
bound estimates of inequality of opportunity; including any additional circumstances would 
cause each cell to be further subdivided.”(p. 127) 
 
 The difficulty of course is that the lower bound is just that.  An alternative number which 
exceeds the estimate is equally valid.  Thus in the case where the contribution of the 
circumstance variables is estimated as 25%, the contribution could equally well be 75%.  But the 
fact that 25% is the number that is produced in front of the policy makers will make it akin to a 
point estimate in the policy discourse, no matter how much the analyst caveats it as a lower 
bound.  Thus an estimate of the IEO is not quite the same as other standard poverty or inequality 
measures.  We cannot say how far the IEO of a specific country at a specific date falls short of its 
true value.  Countries could presumably have the same true value but have different estimated 
values, and vice versa.  A country’s estimated IEO value could presumably fall over time 
without its true value falling.  This makes an IEO estimate potentially highly misleading.  And it 
marks out the IEO as different from a poverty or inequality number.  There may be data issues 
that make poverty and inequality estimates problematic, but they do not lead us to systematically 
underestimate what we are trying to measure by an inherently unknown amount.  
 
 To this must be added another worrying aspect of the empirical approach.  The extent of 
inequality of opportunity reported to policy makers will be dependent on whether or not the data 
set collects certain types of information.   So estimates across countries will either be determined 
by the lowest common denominator of commonly available variables, or will be simply not 
comparable, even as a lower bound.  
 
 The reservations above all take for granted de Barros et al.’s (2009) partitioning of 
influences on outcomes into illegitimate and legitimate.  In the former, they include gender, race 
or ethnicity, birthplace, the educational attainment of the mother, the educational attainment of 
the father, and the main occupation of the father.  All other influences necessarily fall into the 
group of legitimate influences.  De Barros et al. (2009) explicitly highlight – with approval – the 
inclusion of effort and luck among these.  Yet if some of the variation is due to “brute luck” in 
the words of Dworkin (1981b), then much of the philosophical discourse would argue for it to be 
a legitimate cause for intervention.  Indeed, the previous section has argued that even for “option 
luck”, which is the result of individual choices; the extreme low end of variation in outcomes is 
also a legitimate cause for intervention.  These considerations are swept under the carpet when 
inequality decompositions are presented as estimates of “inequality of opportunity.”  
 
4. Children, Education and Health  
 Questions about the practical usefulness of the concept of equality of opportunity become 
even tougher when the focus shifts from income and consumption to education and health, 
especially when the exercise involves children, who, even in health, end up hogging the spotlight 
in such exercises.  
 
 The de Barros et al. (2009) study is again a useful place to start.  This is in part because 
of its influence, but in part because it illustrates nicely the challenges faced by anyone wanting to 
make the case that the equality of opportunity approach has practical usefulness.  While income 
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is the main focal variable in the IEO work, the same methodology is also used to partition 
inequalities in educational attainment among 15-year olds into legitimate and illegitimate sources 
of inequality.  The same concerns about the methodology – notably the estimates being a lower 
bound – apply with equal force to educational attainment as to income.  Conceptual and 
normative questions to do with the partitioning of influences into the J’s and the U’s also apply. 
But these also apply to the second methodological approach developed by de Barros et al. – the 
Human Opportunities Index (HOI) – to which we now turn before dealing with the tough 
normative questions that arise in the context of education and health in both exercises.  
 
 In many ways, the HOI is the authors’ preferred approach in de Barros et al. (2009), 
because it focuses on children and on access to basic services including education and health. 
The strong suggestion in the motivating discussion of the study is that with this focus there is 
likely to be a strong consensus on the policy objectives: 
 “This study defines basic opportunities as a subset of goods and services for children, 
such as access to education, to safe water, or to vaccinations, that are critical in determining 
opportunity for economic advancement in life. These are either affordable by society at large 
already, or could be in the near future, given the available technology. Universal provision of 
basic opportunities is a valid and realistic social goal. In the case of children, most societies 
agree on the importance of a set of basic opportunities, at least at the level of intentions; even if 
different societies might have different standards about the right set of basic opportunities, there 
is some global consensus on a few of them, just as there is consensus regarding the Millennium 
Development Goals. Here we include as basic opportunities variables related to education 
(completion of sixth grade on time, and school attendance at ages 10–14) and housing 
conditions (access to clean water, sanitation, and electricity).” (p. 3) 
 
 Thus the authors start with the outcome variable as being access to social infrastructure 
such as education, health, water, electricity, etc.  The empirical focus is on the access of children 
to these services.  Each child either does or does not have access to the service in question.  The 
authors first estimate how the probability of a child’s access depends on its circumstance 
variables: “parents’ education, family per capita income, gender, family structure (number of 
siblings, single-parent household) and area of residence (urban versus rural).” (p. 66).  The 
predicted probability clearly varies with circumstances.  This predicted probability is then 
compared to the average probability of access across all circumstance variables.  The differences 
in the predicted probability relative to the average are then used to construct a measure of 
inequality in access, and this is the inequality of opportunity.  The specific measure used is a 
form of dissimilarity index based on the absolute difference between each individual value and 
the average.  The authors further argue that the average access measure can be deflated by the 
dissimilarity index to give a measure of effective access correcting for inequality of opportunity 
– their Human Opportunity Index (HOI). 
 
 A number of specific questions can be raised on the dissimilarity index and the implicit 
weights used for small and large departures from the average.  Alternative weights would of 
course lead to different measures of inequality of opportunity as formulated.  But a more 
important point is that analogous criticisms can be made to this approach as were applied to the 
first approach discussed in Section 3.  In the limit, if enough variables are used, each child’s 
access can be predicted perfectly so we are measuring inequality of the binary variable access/no 
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access. Using fewer variables than this will reduce the dissimilarity index.  Put another way, 
adding more circumstance variables will increase the measured inequality of opportunity.  Thus 
in this case as well the number put out for policy purposes is a lower bound and open to similar 
notes of caution in the policy discourse. 
 
 In fact, as one of us has argued elsewhere (Wagstaff, 2013), the whole empirical 
approach used by de Barros et al. (2009) in their HOI is misplaced, given what they say early on 
in the book about the appropriate partitioning of influences into J’s and U’s: 
 “… from an empirical standpoint, the principle of equality of opportunity as “leveling the 
playing field” can be readily operationalized by measuring children’s access to basic goods and 
services that are critical for the full development of a child. For children, access defines 
“opportunity,” because children (unlike adults) cannot be expected to make the efforts needed to 
access these basic goods by themselves.” (p.3)  
 
Thus despite apparently taking the view that all inequality in these childhood variables is unjust, 
de Barros et al. (2009) develop a measure of inequality of opportunity that picks up only a part 
of the observed inequality.  There is an inconsistency here that is puzzling to say the least.   
 
 This raises the more general question of what influences on education and health 
variables belong in the J’s and what belong in the U’s.  The partitioning of certain influences on 
education and health outcomes – notably parental influences, luck and talents – has proved 
especially challenging.  It is worth going through these issues carefully.  
 
One person’s outcomes depend on another person’s efforts  
 
 Most of the outcome indicators investigated by de Barros et al. in HOI relate to children. 
In early childhood, it is the effort of the parent – not that of the child – that shapes outcomes.  A 
one-year old infant cannot be said to exert effort to be immunized (one of the outcomes 
examined by de Barros et al. (2009)); rather it is the parent who makes or does not make the 
effort.  The same is true of other outcomes in infancy.  At the very minimum then it would seem 
that all inequalities among infants should be deemed unjust.  This is, in fact, the stated view of de 
Barros et al. (2009), even though in their operationalization of the HOI they deviate from this 
stance.  
 
 As a child moves through infancy into childhood then into the teenage years and then to 
the cusp of adulthood, the role of the child’s own effort in shaping outcomes increases.  This is 
truer of individual-level outcomes than of household-level outcomes, such as whether a family 
has access to safe water – another of the outcomes considered by de Barros et al. (2009).  These 
household-level outcomes reflect almost entirely the decisions and efforts of parents, and it 
seems likely that most people would agree that inequalities among children in water and 
sanitation are unjust no matter how they arose.  Again this is the stated view of de Barros et al. 
(2009) but not the view implied by their decomposition.  
 
 What of inequalities in individual-level outcomes after infancy?  Take inequalities in 
primary school completion and educational attainment at age 15 – two of the other indicators 
used by de Barros et al. (2009).  Insofar as these reflect inequalities in children’s efforts and 
12 
 
choices, are these inequalities unjust?  De Barros et al. (2009) argue that inequalities in primary 
completion reflect parental effort and are hence unjust, even though – as with the other childhood 
indicators – they go on to separate out the part of the inequality due to inequalities in 
circumstance.  By contrast, in their IEO exercise they group inequalities in educational 
attainment at age 15 with inequalities in income, and in both cases strip out the contribution from 
inequality of circumstance; the rationale in both cases is that the part of the inequality due to 
inequality in effort is not unjust.  
 
 Roemer (1998) – whose work inspired de Barros et al. (2009)– has a different viewpoint. 
He argues that insofar as they reflect inequalities in parental pressure or influence, inequalities in 
childhood outcomes (including presumably inequalities among young teenagers) should be 
counted as inequalities in circumstance not as inequalities in effort; Roemer would want to 
extract from the inequality in outcome both the part caused by inequality in circumstance and the 
part caused by inequality in parental pressure.  De Barros et al.’s de facto position is actually 
closer to that of Barry (2005), who argues that the inequality in parental effort and influence 
should not be parceled out, and that it is a just source of inequality.   
 
 The argument of de Barros et al. (2009) could be that we are constrained by data which 
does not allow us to separate out the effects of parental influence, and that their estimate of HOI, 
just like their estimate of IEO, contains an underestimate of the true inequality of opportunity. 
But we are then up against the same set of issues as discussed in the previous section – the 
danger that the value of HOI is taken not as an underestimate but as a point estimate; and that the 
value of HOI across countries may be determined simply by differences in data availability, not 
true differences in equality of opportunity.   
 
Luck and risk  
 
 De Barros et al. (2009) argue that inequality in outcomes due to differences in luck is 
just:  “In an ideal world, inequality in outcomes should reflect only differences in effort and 
choices individuals make, as well as luck.” (p. 15).  This has echoes of Friedman’s (1962) lottery 
example, and prompts several questions.  
 
 Does it matter whether the person freely takes a risky decision?  What about children 
whose educational attainment and health depend on the choices their parents make as well as 
their luck?  If a child is unlucky enough to contract a respiratory disease by inhaling the smoke 
from his parents’ cigarettes, is that still just?  If a child performs badly in his school exams at age 
15 because he is unlucky enough to see his parents separate and then divorce in the year before 
his exams, should we take this bad luck into account in assessing the justness of differences in 
educational attainment?  Note this is not quite the same as the case of parental effort.  Not every 
passive smoker falls ill.  And some marriages keep going while others end, despite the best 
efforts of the two parties to keep it together. In both cases, the child got unlucky, but in neither 
case did the child freely take a risky decision.  
 
 What if the behavior was shaped by parental influences during childhood?  Suppose, for 
example, a child acquires a taste for smoking or excessive drinking during youth by living in a 
home where smoking and drinking are the norm.  This relates back to the debates between 
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Dworkin, Roemer and Swift reviewed in Section 2.  Roemer at least would want these influences 
removed. 
 
 Do we think differently about luck depending on whether the risky activity is essential to 
a person’s flourishing as a human being?  Nobody needs to smoke or consume alcohol 
excessively, for example; in effect, the default choice is not to engage in these activities.  People 
take a proactive decision to deviate from the default in the pursuit of short-term pleasure 
knowing they raise their risk of illness and premature death.  By contrast, people do need to eat; 
eating is the default choice.  Moreover, many would argue that for various reasons – including 
convenience, cost, and commercial pressures – the default diet today is a diet that poses risks to 
health, and that people have to make a conscious and determined effort to eat in a way that 
lowers health risks.  This is not a trivial comparison: dietary risks are estimated to have 
accounted for more deaths worldwide in 2010 than alcohol and tobacco combined (Lim et al., 
2014).  
 
 Does it matter how much is known about the risks involved and how well publicized they 
are?  The risks associated with smoking and excessive alcohol consumption are well known and 
well publicized, but the evidence on diet is more complex, more fluid, and less well publicized. 
For example, given the attention they receive in the media, one might imagine the big culprits in 
relation to diet are too little polyunsaturated fatty acid, and too much processed meat, trans-fatty 
acids, sugar-sweetened beverages and red meat.  Yet these are not actually the biggest causes of 
diet-related deaths worldwide:  over six times as many deaths are attributable to people 
consuming too much sodium, and too little fruit, nuts, seeds, vegetables and whole grains (Lim et 
al., 2014).  
 
 These issues aside, should we hold people accountable for bad luck, or only for risky 
behavior?  De Barros et al. (2009) and Friedman (1962) argue the former.  But there is an 
alternative school of thought that argues the opposite (see e.g. Le Grand 1987; Cappelen and 
Norheim 2005), namely that holding people accountable for outcomes is too strong, and that 
people should not be held accountable for their bad luck (“brute luck” as Dworkin calls it); in 
this view, luck is just one of the many of Roemer’s “circumstances beyond a person’s control.” 
Insofar as is feasible, smokers and drinkers should, according to this viewpoint, receive whatever 
additional health care is required to reduce their odds of premature death to the odds faced by 
everyone else.  The accountability for risky behavior (“option luck” as Dworkin calls it) comes 
in through taxation: consumption of tobacco and alcohol (as well as e.g. sodium, red meat, sugar-
sweetened beverages, etc.) should be taxed at such a rate that the revenues that cover the extra 
expected health care costs.  
 
Talent  
 
 De Barros et al. (2009) argue that inequality in outcomes stemming from differences in 
talents is just:  “Success in life should depend on people’s choices, effort, and talents, not on 
their circumstances at birth.” (p. 1).  This is also a contestable position.  They are not alone in 
taking this stance, but it is a contestable one.  
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 The Oxford English Dictionary defines talent as a “power or ability of mind or body 
viewed as something divinely entrusted to a person for use and improvement”.  Thus people are 
endowed with a natural or innate talent, and this talent can be both used and cultivated.  A talent 
cannot be cultivated from nothing, so in this sense endowed talents impose limits on the talents 
people can have in later life.  One can become wealthy without inheriting wealth, but one would 
find it hard to say the least to become a concert pianist without some endowment of musical 
talent.  
 
 Since endowed talents are by definition beyond an individual’s control, it is odd that de 
Barros et al. (and others) are so quick to accept as just inequalities stemming from inequalities in 
talents.  More in keeping with Roemer’s approach would be an attempt to parcel out the part of 
the inequality in outcome stemming from inequality in endowed talent and treat this as a source 
of inequity; the remaining part – due to differences in acquired talent – would be considered 
equitable.  One might argue that one should go further and strip out some of the inequality due to 
inequality in acquired talent.  After all the degree to which people can cultivate an innate talent 
depends on their circumstances during childhood and on efforts made by parents; inequality 
arising from the first is agreed to be unjust by everyone, and for those like Roemer inequality 
stemming from the second is also unjust.  
 
Conclusion  
 
 None of the above is to question the enormous contribution on the determinants of 
inequality of outcomes that has been made by the empirical literature which tries to measure and 
quantify “inequality of opportunity” in an attempt to make the concept more policy relevant.    
De Barros et al. (2009) and the related literature has in effect analyzed the determinants of a 
range of outcome variables.  Such analyses have always been conducted, but the rubric of 
“equality of opportunity” has given a push to this analysis in the empirical domain.  And if the 
use of the label “equality of opportunity” opens doors with policy makers to present results to 
them which would otherwise be ignored if they were labeled “equality of outcomes”, or simply 
“equality” or “equity”, then this development is to be welcomed for that reason as well.  
 
 But the use of the aura of equality of opportunity as a concept, as a metaphor and as a 
label comes with its own problems, and these problems are magnified when the concept is 
applied and implemented with a view to contributing to the policy discourse on inequality. 
Health inequality is emblematic of the difficulties that current approaches face.  If children’s 
health is truly outside their control, then all of the inequality in their health is a legitimate 
objective of policy, not just that part which is explained by variables which measure parental 
circumstances.  Similarly, especially for children but also for adults, if bad luck leads to ill health 
then wiping out this inequality as illegitimate for policy concern does not sit well with moral 
intuition – and yet that is what the present procedures which calculate inequality of opportunity 
in health tend to do. 
 
 At the same time, the present exercises skirt some fundamental questions in equity of 
outcomes (cf. e.g. Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993).  One concerns the evaluation of the joint 
distribution of income and health.  For adults, should health inequality be assessed as a 
standalone phenomenon, or should the correlation between income and health be a key 
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normative criterion over and above the inequality of health and income taken separately (cf. e.g. 
Atkinson, 2011; Bleichrodt and van Doorslaer 2006; Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2011)?  Such 
specific normative questions, and the specific causal determinants of different outcomes, are 
more likely to be useful to the policy discourse than general overarching attempts to quantify an 
abstract notion of “equality of opportunity.” 
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